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Hydropower reform efforts and the process for relicensing pri-
vate hydropower projects emerged as an important tool for river
restoration advocates in the mid-1980s.1  With the removal of the
Edwards Dam from Maine’s Kennebec River in 1999, river and
fish advocates focused with renewed energy on the possibilities
contained in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) relicensing process for restoring rivers across the coun-
try.2  Today, numerous proposals exist to retrofit hydropower fa-
1 David H. Becker, The Challenges of Dam Removal: The History and Lessons of
the Condit Dam and Potential Threats from the 2005 Federal Power Act Amend-
ments , 36 ENVTL. L. 811, 812 (2006).
2 Id.  at 813; see also  Philip M. Bender, Restoring the Elwha, White Salmon, and
Rogue Rivers: A Comparison of Dam Removal Proposals in the Pacific Northwest ,
17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 189, 242 (1997) (concluding that survival of
salmon on many rivers depends on dam removal); Michael C. Blumm & Viki A.
Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism in
Hydroelectric Licensing , 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 82 (2001) (recognizing the Fed-
eral Power Act (FPA) as an influential environmental law to address fish and wild-
life concerns, water quality and water-based recreational activities); cf.  Charlton H.
Bonham, The Condit Dam Removal and Section 18 of the Federal Power Act: A Co-
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cilities with fish passages and screens, to operate projects in a
manner that recognizes natural river function, and in some in-
stances to decommission and remove hydropower facilities from
our nation’s waterways.  Dam decommissioning and removal, a
solution once thought unspeakable, has emerged as an important
and viable consideration in resolving many of the most conten-
tious water issues in the United States.  The FERC relicensing
process in the Klamath Basin provides one such example.
For decades the various parties and interests in the Klamath
Basin of southern Oregon and northern California have at-
tempted to craft proposals that would resolve long-standing dis-
putes over water quantity and quality.  The State of Oregon
initiated a general stream adjudication in 1975, and at various
points in the administrative process the parties tried to negotiate
a satisfactory settlement.3  In the litigation that followed the
water-delivery curtailment to the Bureau of Reclamation Project
in 2001, the federal district court attempted to facilitate settle-
ment negotiations among the various parties.4
In all, countless hours and massive quantities of money have
been spent to address the water allocation issues in the Basin.
These efforts were largely unsuccessful until recently for a vari-
ety of reasons—not the least of which was the inability of any
given process to bring all relevant players actively to the negoti-
ating table.  During the Journal of Environmental Law and Liti-
gation  (JELL) Symposium, “At the Crossroads: In Search of
Sustainable Solutions in the Klamath Basin,” for which this Arti-
cle was prepared, one overriding theme seemed to emerge—the
real possibility of settlement in the Basin through a renewal of
political attention from the Governors of Oregon and Califor-
nia.5  This Article explores recent developments inside and
outside of the Klamath Basin, particularly in the context of hy-
erced Settlement , 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 97, 103, 104 (1999) (concluding that the
Condit settlement was the result of coerced negotiations brought about by the finan-
cial costs imposed by section 18 fishway prescriptions).
3 See  Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath
Basin Water and the Endangered Species Act , 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 209-210
(2002); Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big is Big? The Scope of Water Rights Suits Under
the McCarran Amendment , 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 627, 642-43 (1988); see also OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 539.005-.350 (2005) (declaring the legislative purpose and providing statu-
tory authority to carry out general stream adjudication in Oregon).
4 For an in-depth discussion of the post-2001 Klamath Basin litigation, see infra
Part II.E.
5 Glen Spain, Klamath: The Forgotten Basin? , 34 WATER REPORT Dec. 15, 2006 at
1, 11.
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dropower relicensing, that may be contributing to efforts to at-
tain sustainable solutions and resolve some of the long-standing
conflicts.
Focusing on the Klamath Basin, this Article examines the ma-
jor hydropower relicensing provisions of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005;6 evaluates the relevant provisions of the Department of
Interior’s implementing regulations for section 241 of the Energy
Policy Act; and discusses two significant opinions, one adminis-
trative and one judicial, that will undoubtedly impact the water
users and managers in the Basin.  Finally, the Article briefly dis-
cusses factors outside of the FERC relicensing process, including
the resolution of the legal challenge to the 2001 water curtail-
ment, the results of the challenge to the most recent biological
opinion for the coho salmon in the Klamath River, and the pend-
ing Fifth Amendment Takings litigation in the Court of Federal
Claims that may also contribute to a changed dynamic among the
various stakeholders.
I
BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION AND HYDROPOWER LICENSING
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, otherwise known
as FERC, has the authority to issue licenses for private hydro-
power projects for a period of thirty to fifty years.7  The Federal
Water Power Act (FWPA) of 1920 created the Federal Power
Commission and vested this commission with the authority to is-
sue hydropower licenses.8  In 1935, Congress amended the
FWPA to create an independent regulatory agency—the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission—and expanded the jurisdiction
of this new agency to the licensing and relicensing of non-federal,
private hydropower dams on navigable waters.9  The 1986 Elec-
tric Consumers Protection Act, which amended the FPA, made
significant strides toward balancing the power and non-power in-
6 Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
10, 15, 16, 22, 26, 30, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
7 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2006).
8 Law of June 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended in Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a-825r (2006)).
9 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803
(1935) (codified as amended in Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a-825r (2006)).
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terests in the licensing process.10  As a result of the 1986 amend-
ments, the FPA provides that non-power interests be given
“equal consideration” with power interests in the licensing and
relicensing processes, and allows interested parties, including
tribes and non-governmental groups, the right to participate in
the regulatory process relating to hydropower relicensing.11
In addition to the forum that the FPA provides for non-gov-
ernmental interests, the statute also sets forth specific authorities
for state and federal resource agencies to protect natural re-
source and tribal interests in the licensing and relicensing pro-
cess.12  These authorities fall into two general categories:
mandatory authorities under which FERC has no discretion to
reject the recommendations of the agencies and non-mandatory
authorities for which FERC retains discretion to make the final
decisions.13
The mandatory authorities generally exercised by federal re-
source agencies are found in sections 4 and 18 of the FPA.14  Sec-
tion 4(e) provides the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture
with authority to issue conditions on a license for the adequate
protection and utilization of reservations within their jurisdic-
tion.15  For the U.S. Department of Agriculture, this authority
covers all national forest lands.16  The Department of the Interior
houses several agencies with lands that meet the definition of res-
10 See  Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 16 U.S.C.).
11 16 U.S.C. § 797(e); see  Blumm & Nadol, supra  note 2, at 101 n.24. See gener- R
ally , Sarah C. Richardson, The Changing Political Landscape of Hydropower Project
Relicensing , 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 499 (2000) (providing an
overview of modern hydropower relicensing); Joseph Barwick, Agency Conditions
on the Relicensing of Hydropower Projects on Federal Reservations , 19 ENERGY L.J.
397 (1998) (analyzing procedures for relicensing under the FPA).
12 See  16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823d.
13 See id.  §§ 797(e), 803(a)(1), 803(j), 811.
14 § 401 of the Clean Water Act also includes mandatory conditions for state
water quality agencies. See  33 U.S.C. § 1341(a), (d) (2006); Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1
of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
15 16 U.S.C. § 797(e); see also Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. LaJolla Band of Mis-
sion Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 777 (1984) (holding that FERC must include the 4(e)
conditions in any license it issues, and that once FERC issues the license, the appli-
cant or other parties can seek judicial review, including review of the Department’s
mandatory conditions).
16 See  16 U.S.C. §§ 551, 797(e); see also  United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F.
Supp. 2d 964, 977-78 (2004) (explaining that “[t]he Forest Service, a division of the
United States Department of Agriculture, is empowered to act on behalf of the
United States by and through 16 U.S.C. § 551 to secure, protect and preserve our
national forests”).
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ervation under 4(e), including the Bureau of Indian Affairs for
Indian reservations, the Bureau of Reclamation for lands associ-
ated with reclamation projects, the Bureau of Land Management
for reservations of land in the public domain, and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service for lands in the National Wildlife Refuge
System and certain lands administered by the National Park Ser-
vice.17  The Departments of the Interior and Agriculture may is-
sue conditions “deemed necessary” for the “adequate protection
and utilization of [the] reservation.”18  The FPA also provides
mandatory authority in section 18 specifically for the Depart-
ments of the Interior and Commerce to propose prescriptions on
a license for fish passage through a project.19
The non-mandatory authorities are found in section 10 of the
FPA.  Specifically, sub-section 10(a)(1) provides that hydropower
licenses must be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for im-
proving or developing waterways, improving water power devel-
opment, for the adequate protection, mitigation and
enhancement of fish and wildlife, and for other beneficial public
uses.20  In determining whether a license is best adapted to this
17 Section 4(e) of the FPA provides that licenses issued under that section “shall
be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of the department under
whose supervision such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the adequate pro-
tection and utilization of such reservations.” 16 U. S. C. § 797(e).  The term “reser-
vations,” as used in the section 4(e), includes certain lands and facilities under the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture, and
various components of the Department of the Interior (namely, the Fish and Wild-
life Service, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bu-
reau of Reclamation, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs).  Resource Agency
Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in Hydropower Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg.
69,804, 69,806 (Nov. 17, 2005).  Similarly, section 18 of the FPA provides that the
Department of the Interior, acting through the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
Department of Commerce, acting through the National Marine Fisheries Service,
may prescribe fishways to provide for the safe, timely and effective passage of fish.
Id.
18 16 U.S.C. § 797(e).  For purposes of the Federal Power Act,
“reservations” means national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian
reservations, military reservations, and other lands and interest in lands
owned by the United States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from
private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws; also lands
and interests in lands acquired and held for any public purposes; but shall
not include national monuments or national parks. . . .
Id. § 796(2).  “Reservations” refers to lands that are not subject to private appropri-
ation and disposal under public land laws.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. Oregon, 349 U.S.
435, 443-44 (1955).  They include “interests in lands owned by the United States” but
do not include water rights. Escondido Mut. Water Co. , 466 U.S. at 781.
19 16 U.S.C. § 811.
20 Id.  § 803(a)(1).
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comprehensive plan, FERC must consider the recommendations
of state and federal agencies and Indian tribes.21  Section 10(j)
provides that the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, NOAA Fisheries,
and state fish and wildlife agencies may make recommendations
to FERC on conditions for the protection, mitigation, and en-
hancement of fish and wildlife affected by the project.22  FERC
must accept recommendations made pursuant to section 10(j) un-
less FERC determines that the recommendation is inconsistent
with the purposes and requirements of the FPA.23
The Supreme Court held in Escondido Mutual Water Co. v.
LaJolla Band of Mission Indians  that FERC must include the
4(e) conditions in any license it issues.24  The mandatory nature
of section 18 prescriptions has also been upheld in federal court
in American Rivers v. FERC .25  Once FERC issues a license, the
applicant or other parties can seek judicial review—including re-
view of the federal agency’s mandatory conditions—but FERC
has no discretion to deny the inclusion of the mandatory condi-
tions and prescriptions that are presented by the resource agen-
cies.26  By confirming the mandatory nature of the conditions
and prescriptions under the section 4(e) authority, the federal
courts empowered the resource agencies to use the relicensing
process to protect public interests.  Prior to Escondido  and
American Rivers , FERC believed it operated as the final arbiter
of which conditions and prescriptions were actually included in
the license.  After these cases, any challenge to a mandatory con-
dition or prescription is resolved by the federal court.27
Many of the licenses issued under the FPA for non-federal hy-
dropower are currently in the renewal process.  In fact, between
1993 and 2010, a total of 419 projects will be relicensed.28  The
21 Id.  § 803(a)(2).
22 Id. § 803(j).
23 Id.
24 466 U.S. at 777.
25 Am. Rivers v. FERC, 201 F.3d 1186, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that FERC
cannot modify, reject, or reclassify any section 18 fishway prescription submitted by
the Secretaries of Interior or Commerce).
26 Escondido Mutual Water Co. , 466 U.S. at 777; Am. Rivers , 201 F.3d at 1210; see
also  City of Tacoma v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that
FERC cannot refuse to incorporate conditions because they are “untimely” under
the FERC regulations).
27 Judicial review of FERC decisions rests with the courts of appeals under 16
U.S.C. § 825l(b) (2006).
28 ROBERT BLACK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
FOR HYDROPOWER PROJECT RELICENSING: GUIDANCE AND ALTERNATIVE METH-
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federal resource agencies are devoting significant time and staff
to fulfill the FPA authorities, including mandatory conditions and
prescriptions.  Non-governmental groups have seized the oppor-
tunity to participate in the relicensing process despite how time-
consuming and expensive the endeavor may be.  Under the new
integrated licensing process (ILP),29 the relicensing process is un-
likely to conclude in less than five years given the timelines for
each stage.  Even at five years, the ILP represents a significant
stride toward more efficient resolution of the process.  The ILP
was designed to streamline the licensing process by allowing the
pre-filing consultation process and the scoping process under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to occur simultane-
ously rather than sequentially.30  Even so, the ILP is a multi-year
process that involves more that twenty distinct steps and associ-
ated deadlines.31
The process is divided into two main phases.  The pre-applica-
tion phase requires a pre-application document that sets forth an
overview of all existing information related to the project, includ-
ing known environmental impacts.32  The pre-application stage
also includes scoping under NEPA and the development of a
study plan to address issues that are necessary for any condition
in the licensing decision.33  The pre-application stage concludes
with the development and filing of the license application, which
must be filed with FERC at least two years before the existing
license expires.34  The post-application process involves NEPA
compliance, the submission of mandatory terms and conditions,
Endangered Species Act (ESA) consultation, water-quality certi-
fication, and compliance with the Coastal Zone Management Act
and the National Historic Preservation Act.35  The process ulti-
ODS, 1-2 exhibit 1-1 (1998), available at http://www.fws.gov/policy/ hydrochap1.pdf
(citing OFFICE OF HYDROPOWER LICENSING, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
RELICENSES FORECAST 1993-2010 (1993)).
29 On July 23, 2003, FERC published a final rule establishing a new process called
the integrated licensing process. See  104 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2003).  FERC retained its
other two processes, the traditional licensing process and the alternative licensing
process, but the ILP is now the default process. See  18 C.F.R. §§ 5.1(f), 5.3 (a)-
(b)(2007).
30 See  43 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2006); 104 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2003).
31 See  18 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-5.26.
32 18 C.F.R. § 5.6.
33 See  18 C.F.R. § 5.9; 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2006).
34 18 C.F.R. §§ 5.17-5.18.
35 See  18 C.F.R. §§ 5.24-5.25 (NEPA compliance); 18 C.F.R. §§ 5.23-5.24
(mandatory terms and conditions); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02,
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mately concludes with the issuance of a new licensing order by
FERC.36  After the license has been issued, the license, including
the Department’s conditions and prescriptions, is subject to re-
hearing before FERC and subsequent judicial review in the fed-
eral courts of appeals.37
II
AMENDMENTS TO THE FPA IN THE ENERGY POLICY
ACT OF 2005
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the EPAct of 2005 or EPAct),38
was the first major energy bill enacted by Congress since 1992.39
As such, it addressed the full range of energy issues from energy
production and alternative fuels, to nuclear power and natural
gas.  Though compromises to resource protection were made, the
final legislation also contained important victories from an envi-
ronmental protection perspective.  For example, Congress ulti-
mately shelved the debate over drilling in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge.40  Congress also declined the opportunity to
place liability limitations in the context of ongoing litigation on
methyl tertiary butyl ether pollution.41  Despite these gains,
402.14 (ESA consultation); 18 C.F.R. § 5.23(b) (water-quality certification); 16
U.S.C. § 1456 (2006) (Coastal Zone Management Act compliance); 16 U.S.C.
§§ 470-470x-6 (National Historic Preservation Act compliance).
36 18 C.F.R. § 5.26(e).
37 16 U.S.C. § 825l(6) (2006).
38 Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
7, 10, 15, 16, 22, 26, 30, 40 and 42 U.S.C.).
39 See  Paul L. Joskow, U.S. Energy Policy During the 1990s, Prepared for the
“American Economic Policy During the 1990s” Conference at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, 13-14, 17 (July 11, 2001) available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/EnergyPolicy-CEEPR-7-11-01withTables+
Figure.pdf (noting that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 was the only comprehensive
energy policy legislation passed during the 1990s).
40 When the EPAct of 2005 was initially introduced in the House, it included pro-
visions allowing leases on the arctic coastal plain. See  H.R. 6, 109th Cong. §§ 2201-
2212 (as introduced in House, Apr. 18, 2005).  The EPAct included similar provi-
sions when it was introduced in the Senate. See  H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (as placed on
Senate Calendar, June 9, 2005).  However, the EPAct lacked provisions allowing
leases in the arctic coastal plain once Congress enacted the Bill. See  EPAct, Pub. L.
No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 10, 15, 16,
22, 26, 30, 40 and 42 U.S.C.). See also 151 Cong. Rec. S9335 (daily ed. July 29, 2005).
Senator Lieberman noted that “[t]here is also good news to be found in what [the
EPAct] does not do. . . . It does not include provisions for drilling the Arctic Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge.” Id.  at S9351.
41 Original versions of the EPAct included provisions limiting liability for produc-
ers of methyl tertiary butyl ether. See  H.R. 6, 109th Cong. §§ 1503-1505 (as intro-
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many conservation organizations view the EPAct’s hydropower
provisions as a threat to environmental protection, particularly
river restoration.  The provisions that generated the greatest con-
cern among river restoration advocates appear in Title II, Subti-
tle C of the EPAct, which specifically deals with renewable
energy and hydroelectric power production.42
For years private hydropower interests have sought legislation
to counter resource agencies’ mandatory authorities to prescribe
conditions and prescriptions on a new or renewed license.  With
the amendments to the FPA in 2005, hydropower interests found
their reform through the creation of a new layer of administra-
tive review of the conditions and prescriptions that are proposed
by federal resource agencies and submitted to FERC.  Section
241 of the EPAct amends sections 4(e) and 18 of the FPA to pro-
vide for expedited agency trial-type hearings when a license ap-
plicant or other party to a licensing proceeding challenges
disputed issues of material facts that underlie an agency’s prelim-
inary proposed conditions and prescriptions submitted by the re-
source agencies.43  Conservation groups decried the devastating
impact that these changes will have on the willingness of resource
agencies to fully defend their conditions and prescriptions.44  In
addition, though all parties to the licensing proceeding can seek a
trial-type hearing, the expense and time commitment involved
will often make participation too burdensome.
duced in House, Apr. 18, 2005).  However, Congress abandoned these liability-
limiting provisions in the final version of the EPAct. See  EPAct, Pub. L. No. 109-58,
119 Stat. 594; see also  H. Josef Hebert, Associated Press, MTBE Makers Lose , IN-
TELLIGENCER (Wheeling W. Va.), July 25, 2005, at A3, available at  2005 WLNR
11957354 (discussing Congress’ rejection of liability limitations for methyl tertiary
butyl ether producers).
42 §§  241-246, 119 Stat. at 673-79.
43 See  16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2006).
44 Les Blumenthal, Rewriting Dam Rules Could Have Wide Impact; Relicensing:
While Utilities Back Streamlining, Greens Fear Loss of Fish Protections, NEWS TRIB-
UNE (Tacoma, Wash.), May 12 2003, at B1; Ben Geman, Environmentalists call
Hydro, NEPA Language a ‘Perfect Storm,’ ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Apr. 19 2005;
Blaine Harden, Utilities Grasp at Power; Proposed Rule on River Dams Angers Envi-
ronmentalists , WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at A3; Press Release, Am. River, Energy
Bill Hydropower Title Breaks What Has Already Been Fixed (Feb. 16, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.hydroreform.org/news/2005/02/16/energy-bill-hydropower-title-
breaks-what-has-already-been-fixed; Press Release, Am. Rivers, Hydropower Indus-
try Exploiting new Regulatory Loophole, Putting America’s Rivers at Risk (Dec. 20,
2005), available at  http://www.americanrivers.org/site/News2?JServSessionIdr006=
mslmg173c1.app6b&page=NewsArticle&id=8109&news_iv_ctrl=1130.
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Section 241 also provides a process for a party to the proceed-
ing to propose alternative conditions and prescriptions from
those submitted by the resources agencies.45  These two amend-
ments essentially create sub-proceedings in the existing relicens-
ing process.  The obligation to conduct these sub-proceedings
rests with the resource agencies, not FERC, because the agencies
hold the mandatory condition and prescription authority.  Con-
gress gave the resource agencies ninety days to promulgate regu-
lations that would set forth procedures for trial-type hearings and
the submission and consideration of alternative conditions and
prescriptions.46  As a result, the resource agencies promulgated
regulations and released the Interim Final Rule on November 17,
2005.47  The agencies indicated that they would consider promul-
gation of a “revised final rule” within eighteen months of com-
ments—which would be the summer of 2007.48
Now, in addition to the lengthy and time-consuming process
set out for relicensing a project with FERC, a license party may
also request a sub-administrative proceeding specifically chal-
lenging the facts underlying the resource agency’s conditions and
prescriptions.49  The resource agencies are now required to pro-
vide an on-the-record administrative hearing, if requested, re-
garding issues of material fact that arise in the conditions and
prescriptions for inclusion in a hydropower license.50  An admin-
istrative law judge must preside over the proceedings.51  The pro-
cess includes motions, discovery, and the presentation of
arguments and evidence.52  All of this occurs on a very tight
ninety day timeline.53  Moreover, as the examples below will
demonstrate, determining which facts are material to the condi-
tions and prescriptions can prove lengthy and time consuming.
For example, the resource agencies spent considerable resources
to resolve the underlying material facts associated with the re-
quest for an administrative hearing for the conditions and pre-
45 See  § 823d.
46 Id.  § 797(e).
47 See generally  Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in
Hydropower Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804 (Nov. 17, 2005).
48 See id.  at 69,804.
49 See 16 U.S.C. § 797(e). See generally  Resource Agency Procedures for Condi-
tions and Prescriptions in Hydropower Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804.
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scriptions proposed by the resource agencies for the Klamath
Project.
In addition to the hearings process described above, Congress
also amended section 33 of the FPA to allow the license applicant
or any other party to the license proceeding to propose alterna-
tive conditions and prescriptions to those set forth by the re-
source agencies, adding another sub-proceeding to an already
dense administrative process.54  The legislation establishes stan-
dards to govern whether the secretary of each agency approves
or rejects the alternative condition or prescription.  Specifically,
the amendments direct the appropriate secretary to adopt an al-
ternative condition and/or prescription unless  the Secretary de-
termines that the alternative condition (1) does not provide for
the adequate protection and utilization of the reservation or is no
less protective than the proposed fishway, and (2) is not more
cost-effective than the original agency condition.55  Moreover,
the EPAct provides for a dispute-resolution process if the secre-
tary declines to adopt the proposed alternatives.56  Parties to the
underlying relicensing process, including nongovernmental
groups that have previously established themselves as a party to
the relicensing proceeding, can invoke both the trial-type hear-
ings and the alternatives process.  In the Klamath Project pro-
ceedings, parties utilized both new provisions and the
administrative processes are complete.57  Although both the
hearings and alternatives process were invoked, the mandatory
condition agency dispute-resolution process has not been in-
voked.  As a result, the Klamath Project relicensing provided the
community with an opportunity to evaluate the implications of
the new EPAct provisions.58
Interestingly, the relicensing process for PacifiCorp’s Klamath
Project may provide the catalyst and forum for resolution of
broader issues in the Basin.  While the FPA and the authority it
provides to protect federal reservations and fisheries resources
has always been regarded as a powerful tool, the passage of the
54 See id.  §§ 811, 823d.
55 See § 823d(a)(2).
56 Id.  § 823d(a)(5).
57 For a detailed discussion of the Klamath litigation, see infra  Part II.E.
58 Several other relicensing projects have moved through this new process includ-
ing the Spokane proceeding and the Bar Mills proceeding.  For a discussion of cases
invoking the new hearings process, see Rick Eichstaedt, Rebecca Sherman & Adell
Amos, More Dam Process: Relicensing of Dams and the 2005 Energy Policy Act ,
ADVOC. (forthcoming June 2007) (on file with author).
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EPAct of 2005, for some, put a damper on enthusiasm about the
relicensing process as a tool for river restoration.  The EPAct
called for extensive new administrative procedures, including a
trial-type hearing on disputed facts and a process for suggesting
alternatives to the conditions placed on a new license.59  These
hearing and alternatives provisions raised questions about the
continued viability and feasibility of the relicensing process as a
tool for river restoration because of the increased cost and bur-
den on advocates and federal agencies.  Often, advocates of river
restoration lack significant financial resources, and the changes
proposed in the relicensing process created additional and costly
administrative proceedings.  Moreover, defending proposed con-
ditions and prescriptions is a costly undertaking for federal agen-
cies already strapped for resources.  There is a concern that the
possibility of a costly and time-intensive hearing might reduce
the incentive for the resource agencies to fully utilize their FPA
authority.  The EPAct provided no adjustment to the resource
agency budgets to accommodate the costs of the trial-type hear-
ings and the alternatives processes.  A closer examination of the
new hearings and alternatives processes will help to clarify the
specific changes that caused the greatest concern in the hydro-
power community.
A. New Hearings Process
Section 241 provides that a party to a license proceeding is en-
titled to a determination, after an expedited agency trial-type
hearing, of any disputed issue of material fact with respect to an
agency’s mandatory conditions or prescriptions for inclusion in a
hydropower license issued by FERC.60  This provision and the
new implementing regulations raise several interesting questions
about the trial-type hearing, including (1) who has party status
and how does one become a party, (2) what constitutes a mate-
rial fact, and (3) who has the burden of production and proof in
the administrative hearing?
1. Who Is a Party?  How Does One Become a Party?
In FERC’s existing licensing process and in the new adminis-
trative process, the applicant for the license is necessarily a party.
License applicants had long sought a mechanism to review the
59 §§ 797(e), 811, 823d.
60 § 797(e).
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resource agencies’ exercise of the mandatory conditioning au-
thority, prior to judicial review in federal courts of appeal.  Ac-
cordingly, the new hearings provisions were drafted with the
applicant in mind, since most often the applicant factually dis-
agrees with the conditions or prescriptions that are provided by
the resource agencies.  The question of party status, however, for
the non-license parties such as tribes, fishing groups, or conserva-
tionists, governs who can have an impact on the outcome of the
relicensing proceeding.  Under FERC’s relicensing process, any
entity that shows a direct interest in the outcome of the proceed-
ing may intervene to become a party.61  For example, a member-
ship organization will have a direct interest in a licensing
proceeding if its members use the affected lands and waters.  An
interested party may file a motion for intervention once FERC
accepts the relevant application for a new license or renewal of a
license.62  The motion to intervene will be granted automatically
unless another party opposes the motion or it is not filed on
time.63  In that case, the motion will be granted only upon
FERC’s approval.64  Under the EPAct amendments, in order to
file a request for a hearing or become an intervener in the trial-
type hearing, one must already be a license party as defined in
FERC’s regulations.65
An intervener in FERC’s underlying relicensing process has
two fundamental rights: to be served with all documents that are
filed in the proceeding and to file a motion to seek rehearing or
judicial review upon a final decision from FERC.66  Nothing in
the EPAct limits or alters the existing statutory and regulatory
provisions regarding party/intervener status.  Thus, under section
241 of the EPAct, a party would be entitled to agency-type hear-
ings on disputed issues of material fact and able to propose alter-
native conditions and prescriptions that the Secretaries would be
61 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(a) (2007); see also HYDROPOWER REFORM COAL., CITIZEN
TOOLKIT FOR EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN HYDROPOWER LICENSING 60 (2005),
available at http://www.hydroreform.org/sites/www.hydroreform.org/files/hydro
guide_11_13.pdf [hereinafter HYDROPOWER TOOLKIT].
62 § 385.210; see also HYDROPOWER TOOLKIT, supra  note 61, at 60. R
63 § 385.214(c)(1).
64 Id.  § 385.214(c)(2).
65 See  16 U.S.C. § 797(e).  FERC regulations defining “party” are found at section
385.102(c).
66 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b); see also  § 385.713; HYDROPOWER TOOLKIT, supra  note 61, R
at 60.
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required to consider in the same manner as alternatives submit-
ted by the license applicant.67
As FERC’s own materials provide, understanding the licensing
process, the regulations and what is expected of each party is key
to participating effectively in the process.68  In fact, increased
public involvement is one of the goals for the ILP, and all partici-
pants play a key role in the ILP from the beginning of the pro-
cess.69  Under the ILP, non-applicant parties to the relicensing
proceeding participate in the process selection, developing the
pre-application document, scoping under NEPA, study requests,
and public commenting on NEPA documents.70  Now, non-appli-
cant parties can request a trial-type administrative hearing and/or
propose alternative conditions and prescriptions under the
EPAct amendments.71  While some in the conservation commu-
nity have viewed these new proceedings as overly burdensome
and cost-prohibitive, others have recognized that the new provi-
sions provide an avenue for non-license applicants with party sta-
tus to challenge material facts and propose alternatives to
resource agencies.  However, the limitations in the alternatives
provision that any proposal cost significantly less or improve op-
eration may reduce the potential alternatives that non-license ap-
plicants may pursue.  To the extent that the conservation
community seeks alternatives to protect resources, they may cost
more or result in more restrictions on the operation of the pro-
ject.  As a result, interested parties with conservation interests
can influence the relicensing process, albeit with a significant
commitment of time and resources, when they perceive that the
resource agencies may not be fully utilizing the mandatory condi-
tion and prescription authority or if they want to participate to
ensure that their interests in the river are protected.  In addition,
67 See  Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in Hydro-
power Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804, 69,804 (Nov. 17, 2005).
68 See, e.g. , FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DEP’T OF ENERGY, IDEAS FOR
IMPLEMENTING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE INTEGRATED LICENSING PROCESS
(ILP): TOOLS FOR INDUSTRY, AGENCIES, TRIBES, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS, CITIZENS AND FERC STAFF 4-5 (2006), available at  http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/ilp/eff-eva/ideas.pdf (providing a detailed
chart of steps in the intergrated licensing process and tips for participation) [herein-
after IDEAS FOR ILP].
69 Id.  at 7.
70 18 C.F.R. §§ 5.3(d), 5.6(a), 5.12; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1502.9(c), 1503.1 (2007);
see also IDEAS FOR ILP, supra  note 68, at 10-20. R
71 See  16 U.S.C. § 797(e).  FERC regulations defining “party” are found at 18
C.F.R. § 385.102(c).
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conservation groups may intervene to support a strong environ-
mental or tribal resource position taken by the resource agencies
in their mandatory conditions and prescriptions.
2. Material Facts
If a party wishes to utilize the new EPAct hearings process,
they must identify a dispute about a material fact.  The interim
regulations define “material facts” as “facts that, if proved, may
affect a Department’s decision whether to affirm, modify, or
withdraw any condition or prescription.”72  The regulation pre-
amble provides some guidance indicating that legal and policy
issues will not qualify as issues of material fact and provides ex-
amples indicating that whether a river has historically been a cold
or warm water fishery or whether fish were historically found
above a dam would constitute material facts.73  The Departments
have reviewed several requests for trial-type hearings and have
objected to any issue that is not factual or is not material.74  Ad-
ministrative law judges have issued various responses.75  Some
have suggested that the party requesting the hearing should have
the opportunity to develop the facts to demonstrate materiality
while others have dismissed outright issues that raise legal, non-
material, and policy questions.
3. Burden of Production and Proof
Congress also left open other details of the administrative sub-
proceeding, including the assignment of the burdens of proof.
These regulations identify what constitutes the burden of proof
72 43 C.F.R. § 45.2 (2006).
73 Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in Hydropower
Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804, 69,809 (Nov. 17, 2005).
74 Information based on author’s personal conversations with Interior Depart-
ment attorneys. See also 70 Fed. Reg. at 69,807-08 (“The Department involved will
review the parties’ submissions to determine whether to stipulate to any facts as
stated by the parties, object that any issue raised by a party either is not factual (i.e.,
is a legal conclusion or a policy determination) or is not material, or agree that the
issues raised are factual, material, and disputed.”).
75 See, e.g. , Idaho Power Co. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Hells Canyon Complex
Hydroelectric Project, No. DCHD-2006-01, FERC Docket No. P-1971 (May 3, 2006)
(order granting motion to establish burden of proof); In re  Klamath Hydroelectric
Project, No. 2006-NMFS-0001, FERC Project No. 2082 (July 13, 2006) (order grant-
ing in part motion to dismiss certain PacifiCorp issues); Avista Corp. v. U.S. Bureau
of Indian Affairs, No. DCHD-2007-1, FERC Docket Nos. 2545, 12606 (Nov. 1, 2006)
(prehearing conference order); Avista Corp. v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Docket No. DCHD-2007-01, FERC Project Nos. 2545, 12606 (Jan. 8, 2007) (final
ALJ decision).
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in the hearing but do not identify which party bears that burden
of proof.  The interim regulations mimicked Congress and did
not resolve questions of who bears the burden of proof.  How-
ever, all of the administrative law judges in the relatively few
proceedings that have reached this stage have held, consistent
with general administrative law principles, that the party request-
ing the hearing bears the burden of proof.76
4. Discovery and the Conduct of the Hearing
The discovery deadlines and hearing schedule timelines are ex-
tremely tight under the new regulations.  The parties must agree
to, or the administrative law judge must order, discovery,77 and if
discovery is agreed to or ordered, the regulations provide that it
must be completed in approximately twenty-five days.78  The reg-
ulations require written direct testimony to be submitted within
five days after the completion of discovery,79 with commence-
ment of a trial within fifteen days after the completion of discov-
ery.80  Section 45.52 of the interim regulations states that “unless
otherwise ordered by the ALJ, all direct hearing testimony must
be prepared and submitted in the written form.”81  It goes on to
state that any witness submitting written direct testimony must
be available for cross-examination at the hearing.82  Section 45.51
preceding this section states that the parties’ rights at hearing in-
clude the right to present direct and rebuttal evidence, to make
objections, to cross-examine witnesses, and to conduct re-direct
and re-cross.83  These sections, when read together, indicate that
only cross-examination is conducted orally.
B. Alternative Conditions
The EPAct adds a new section to the FPA.  New section 33
allows the license applicant or any other party to a license pro-
ceeding to propose an alternative condition and the Depart-
76 Idaho Power Co ., Docket No. DCHD-2006-01, FERC Docket No. P-1971; see
also In re  Klamath Hydroelectic Project, Docket Number 2006-NMFS-0001, FERC
Project No. 2082 (July 6, 2006) (order granting motion to confirm the burden of
proof).
77 43 C.F.R. § 45.40.
78 Id. § 45.41(i).
79 Id. § 45.52(a)(iii).
80 Id. § 45.50(a).
81 Id. § 45.52.
82 Id.
83 § 45.51.
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ments’ regulations set out procedures for the appropriate
Secretary to consider and approve or reject these alternatives.84
Regardless of whether a license party requests a hearing on
disputed material facts as described above, the license party may
submit one or more alternatives to the conditions and prescrip-
tions set forth by the resource agencies.85  Each department must
formally analyze the alternative conditions or prescriptions and
file a written statement explaining the basis for the decision to
accept or reject the alternative condition(s) or prescription(s).86
These alternatives must be submitted to the appropriate Depart-
ment within thirty days of the issuance of the preliminary condi-
tions and prescriptions by the resource agencies, the same
timeline as the request for a hearing on disputed material facts.87
If a party invokes the hearings process and submits alternatives,
the resource agencies can find themselves in simultaneous ad-
ministrative proceedings on the same set of conditions and pre-
scriptions.  The appropriate Secretary must make a final decision
on the alternatives within sixty days of the close of the comment
period on the environmental impact statement or environmental
assessment for the license.88  By contrast, a hearing must be com-
pleted within ninety days.89
In practice, the Departments have postponed consideration of
the alternatives until after the findings of fact have been made.
The regulations provide that the findings of fact will be consid-
ered by the Secretary in determining whether to modify a prelim-
inary condition or prescription.90  So, essentially this creates
another layer of internal review and justification regarding the
alternatives that can take place after the trial-type hearing has
concluded.
In determining whether to accept or reject a proposed alterna-
tive condition, the resource agencies must consider all evidence,
including information from any license party and FERC, com-
ments received on the department’s preliminary conditions and
84 See  16 U.S.C. § 823d (2006); Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and
Prescriptions in Hydropower Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804, 69,814-15 (Nov. 17,
2005).
85 16 U.S.C. § 823d.
86 43 C.F.R. § 45.73(c).
87 See Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in Hydro-
power Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804, 69,810, 69,814 (Nov. 17, 2005).
88 Id.  at 69,814.
89 Id.
90 70 Fed. Reg. at 69,808.
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on FERC’s NEPA documents, findings of fact from the adminis-
trative law judge if there is a hearing, and the information pro-
vided in support of the alternative condition.91  The resource
agency must adopt a proposed alternative if it will both (1) either
cost significantly less to implement or result in improved opera-
tion of the project for electricity implementation, and (2) if it will
provide for adequate protection and utilization of the reservation
in the case of 4(e) conditions or will not be less protective than
the original fishway prescriptions in the case of section 18.92  If
the Secretary wants to reject an alternative, she must make a
negative finding that the alternative is sufficiently protective of
reservation resources or as protective as the original fishway pre-
scription.  Thus, even a proposed alternative that is less costly or
results in improved power production may be rejected on the ba-
sis of being less protective of the reservation or fish resources.
Though the language in the amendments is unclear, arguably the
Secretary still retains her underlying authority under the FPA
and could reject a proposed alternative if it is not as protective of
the resource.  If the Secretary decides to adopt an alternative, she
must find that the reservation will still be adequately protected in
the case of a 4(e) condition or that the alternative will not be less
protective than the original section 18 prescription and the cost/
improved operation prong.93
Interestingly, Congress chose different language to evaluate an
alternative for a section 4(e) condition and a section 18 prescrip-
tion.  The section 4(e) alternative must provide for adequate pro-
tection and utilization of the reservation,94 but the section 18
alternative must not be less protective than the original prescrip-
tion.95  Ultimately, the standards may be interpreted such that
they have the same substantive effect, but the section 18 standard
seems to provide a greater level of deference to the prescriptions
initially proposed by the resource agency.  In contrast, the sec-
tion 4(e) standard seems to allow a party to challenge the condi-
tion and evaluate it against the statutory language—adequate
protection and utilization of the reservation—rather than against
the original proposed condition.  Arguably, the Secretary retains
91 43 C.F.R. § 45.73(a).
92 Id.  at § 45.73(b).
93 Id.
94 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2006).
95 Id.  § 823d.
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broad discretion, however, to determine adequate protection and
utilization of the reservation under either provision.
When the resource agency files its modified conditions or pre-
scriptions with FERC, the resource agency must also file a writ-
ten statement explaining the basis for its adopted conditions and
prescriptions, as well as the reasons for rejecting any alternatives
not adopted.96  The agency must demonstrate that it gave equal
consideration to the effects of the modified condition and/or pre-
scription and any alternative not adopted on energy supply, dis-
tribution, cost, and use; flood control; navigation; water supply;
air quality; and the preservation of other aspects of environmen-
tal quality.97  In addition to the written statement, the Secretary
is required to submit all studies, data, and other factual informa-
tion available and relevant to the Secretary’s decision.98
The EPAct also sets forth a dispute-resolution process for al-
ternative conditions and prescriptions.  If FERC determines that
a final condition or prescription is inconsistent with applicable
law, FERC may refer the condition to the Commission’s dispute-
resolution service.  The Commission’s dispute-resolution service
must issue a non-binding advisory within ninety days.99  The re-
source agency may accept the advisory unless the recommenda-
tion will not adequately protect the reservation.100  The Secretary
must submit this advisory and the Secretary’s written determina-
tion regarding the advisory into the record before FERC.101
C. The Legal Challenge to the Interim Regulations
The interim final regulations apply to all license proceedings
for which no license had been issued as of November 17, 2005,
including pending applications with previously filed conditions
and prescriptions.102  The inclusion of pending applications under
the new regulatory framework proved very controversial among
river restoration groups.  The regulations provide the license
party with thirty days to request a hearing or propose alterna-
96 43 C.F.R. § 45.73(c).
97 Id.  § 45.73(c)-(d).
98 Id.  § 45.73(c).
99 16 U.S.C. § 823d(a)(5).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in Hydro-
power Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804, 69,804-05 (Nov. 17, 2005).
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tives to the proposed conditions and prescriptions.103  In order to
request this administrative hearing or submit alternative pre-
scriptions or conditions, one must already be a party to the un-
derlying license or relicensing proceeding.104
River restoration advocates criticized the interim regulations
and, ultimately, a coalition of non-governmental organizations
challenged the regulations in federal district court.105  Their first
concern was that the interim regulations essentially allowed for
the reopening of previously negotiated conditions and prescrip-
tions;106 parties feared that licenses that had been through the
process and were already settled on conditions and prescriptions
would be reopened just before the final step of FERC granting
the license.  Second, the interim regulations were released with-
out any allowance for notice and comment rulemaking.107  Fi-
nally, though not specific legal claims, non-governmental groups
raised concerns that rules seemed to encourage or tip the balance
in favor of accepting alternative prescriptions and conditions, be-
cause Congress set the standard for the Secretary’s denial of an
alternative so high.  Similarly, the challenging parties raised con-
cern that license applicants would use the trial-type hearing pro-
cess to delay and extend the already lengthy relicensing process.
As a result, license applicants may be the only parties that could
afford to participate for the duration of the proceeding.  Adding
103 Id.  at 69,807.
104 Id.
105 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Am. Rivers
v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 2006 WL 1176934, (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2006) (No. 05-
2086-MJP); Press Release, American Rivers, Hydropower Industry Exploiting New
Regulatory Loophole, Putting America’s Rivers at Risk (Dec. 20, 2005) (on file with
author), available at  http://www.americanrivers.org/site/News2?JServSessionIdr006=
mslmg173c1.app6b&page=NewsArticle&id=8109&news_iv_ctrl=1130.  The chal-
lenge by conservation groups discussed below is not the only one.  Pend Oreille
County PUD and Ponderay Newspring brought suit in district court challenging the
Department of the Interior’s decision not to afford those parties a trial-type hearing
for the Box Canyon Project. See  Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, Nos. 05-1387 and
06-1389 (D.C. Cir.).  The denial was based on the fact that FERC had already issued
a new license at the time the statute was passed. Id.  The case is currently stayed
because the licensee has also appealed the terms of the license to the D.C. Circuit
and the issues may be addressed at the appellate level.  Information based on au-
thor’s personal conversations with Jennifer Frozena, Attorney-Advisor, U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, Solicitor’s Office, Division of Indian Affairs.  See also  Press Release,
Pend Orville Pub. Utility Dist., PUB Receives Stay for Box Canyon License Condi-
tions (Jan. 18, 2007) (on file with author).
106 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Am. Rivers ,
2006 WL 1176934.
107 Id.
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another administrative step further increased the costs and time
for non-governmental groups, tribes, resource agencies, and in-
terested citizens.
Dismay with the EPAct amendments and the interim regula-
tions was not uniform.  Many groups, particularly license appli-
cants, praised the amendment and regulations as important tools
to reform the hydropower relicensing process, because the new
procedures gave license applicants a voice in the condition and
prescription process and were designed to address concerns over
the inability to administratively appeal mandatory conditions and
prescriptions set by resource agencies.  The trial-type hearing and
alternatives process created a mechanism to challenge the re-
source agency conclusions within the agency itself before “final”
conditions and prescriptions were submitted to FERC.  Addi-
tionally, many believed that the amendments represented an ef-
fort to streamline the relicensing process.  However, because the
changes add additional procedures, it was questionable whether
they truly streamlined the process.
A coalition of conservation groups including American Rivers,
Idaho Rivers United, Friends of the River, American Whitewa-
ter, Trout Unlimited, Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund,
Inc., and North American Outdoors ultimately filed a facial chal-
lenge to the regulations.108  Their challenge included two basic
claims.  First, they asserted that the regulations violated Section
706 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by retroactively
impairing final and preliminary license conditions and prescrip-
tions.109  Second, they argued that the agencies violated the APA
by failing to provide notice and comment rulemaking.110
The U.S. District Court issued its opinion on October 3, 2006,
rejecting plaintiffs’ claims.111  The court reasoned that the In-
terim Regulations were exempt from the APA’s notice and com-
ment requirements because they were procedural and
interpretive rules, not substantive provisions.112  Further, the
court held that the EPAct and the Interim Regulations were not
impermissible retroactive applications of law because the condi-
tions and prescriptions that had been previously submitted did
108 Am. Rivers v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. C05-2086P, 2006 WL 2841929 (D.
Wash. 2006).
109 Id.  at *1, *3.
110 Id.
111 Id.  at *15.
112 Id.  at *6, *15.
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not meet the test of the kind of settled expectations protected
from retroactive application.113
There are three exceptions to the requirements of notice and
comment rulemaking under the APA.  First, procedural rules,
those involving agency organization, procedure, and practice, are
not subject to notice and comment provisions.114  Second, inter-
pretive rules issued by an agency to advise the public of the
agency’s construction of statutes and rules it administers are not
subject to notice and comment requirements.115  Under this ex-
ception, if an agency’s rule merely clarifies or explains existing
laws and regulations or engages in discretionary fine-tuning, the
notice and comment requirements provided in the APA do not
need to be followed.116  Third, the APA provides an exception to
notice and comment rulemaking for good cause, which includes
situations where notice and comment procedures would be im-
practicable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.117  As
the district court noted, the Interim Regulations at issue in this
case were exempt because they qualified as procedural and inter-
pretive rules.118
D. EPAct Provisions Related to Tribal Lands
The EPAct also contains several specific provisions relating to
the development of energy resources on tribal lands.119  While
these provisions do not deal specifically with hydropower licens-
ing, the inclusion of these provisions might help to explain the
trade-offs that tribal entities considered when they decided
whether to support the EPAct provisions on the hearings and al-
ternatives discussed above.120  Indian tribes face unique ques-
tions with regard to energy development on tribal lands in
addition to the issues that arise in the context of protecting reser-
vation lands in the hydropower relicensing process.  Title V,
called the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determi-
nation Act of 2005, amended the Department of Energy Organi-
113 Id.  at *10-11, *15.




118 Id.  at *10-11, *15.
119 See  25 U.S.C. §§ 3502-3506 (2005).
120 See  Andrea S. Miles, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: Tools For Achieving
Energy Development and Tribal Self-Sufficiency or an Abdication of Federal Envi-
ronmental and Trust Responsibilities? , 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 461 (2005-2006).
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zation Act to create the Office of Indian Energy Policy and
Programs within the Department of Energy.121  Title V also pro-
vides for an alternative process for approval of contracts between
tribes and third parties regarding energy projects on tribal lands,
including leases and rights of way across tribal lands.122  If the
tribes enter into a Tribal Energy Resource Agreement with the
Department of Energy, approval of third-party contracts by the
Department of the Interior is not required.123  These provisions
may raise issues if a business agreement affects allotted lands.
According to the language of the EPAct, Tribal Energy Resource
Agreements can cover (1) lease or business agreements for the
purpose of energy resource development, which includes explo-
ration, extraction, processing, and other development of energy
mineral resources located on tribal lands; (2) construction and
operation of electric generation, transmission, or generation fa-
cilities located on tribal lands; (3) facilities to process or refine
energy developed on tribal lands; and (4) rights of way for pipe-
lines or electric transmission or distribution lines.124
The EPAct also provided standards for approval of the Tribal
Resource Agreements.  First, the tribe must demonstrate it has
the capacity to regulate the development of energy resources.125
Second, the tribe needs to show that it has a plan to get necessary
information from the applicant.126  Third, the Tribal Resource
Agreement must contain provisions to deal with amendments
and renewals.127  Fourth, the tribe must address economic return
and appropriate environmental review, provide a public notifica-
tion process, and outline a process to consult with affected
states.128  During debates on passage of the EPAct, concerns
were raised that these provisions were simply a mechanism to
avoid compliance with federal environmental laws, including
NEPA and the ESA.129  Without these agreements, secretarial
approval would be a federal action triggering environmental
compliance.
121 See  42 U.S.C. § 7144e (2006); 25 U.S.C. § 3502(b) (2006).
122 25 U.S.C. § 3504.
123 Id. § 3504(a)(2)(C).
124 Id. § 3504(a)(1), (b), (e).
125 Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(i).
126 Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(I).
127 Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(III).
128 Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii) (IV),(VI)-(X).
129 Miles, supra  note 120, at 463-66. R
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Finally, the EPAct provided grants for new energy programs
on tribal lands.  Within the Department of the Interior, the Act
authorized development grants to tribes and tribal energy-re-
source-development organizations for use in developing or ob-
taining managerial and technical capacity.130  In addition, the
Department is authorized to make low-interest loans to tribes
and organizations for use in promoting energy resource develop-
ment on tribal lands.131  The Act also provides that the Depart-
ment shall make funds available to an “appropriate,” as
determined by the Secretary, tribal environmental organization
that represents multiple tribes to establish a national resource
center to develop tribal capacity and carry out tribal environmen-
tal programs.132
At the Department of Energy, the EPAct authorized a com-
petitive grant program for work in energy conservation, research,
planning, development and maintenance, and carbon sequestra-
tion.133  Congress also directed the Department of Energy to pro-
vide a Loan Guarantee Program for up to ninety percent of the
unpaid principal and interest on any loan made to a tribe for en-
ergy development.134  Each federal power-marketing administra-
tion (Bonneville Power, Western Area Power Administration)
was to encourage tribal energy development and consider the
unique relationship between the United States and tribes.  The
Secretary of Energy must submit a report to Congress that de-
scribes the federal power allocation to or for the benefit of tribes
in a service area of the power marketing administration.135  Con-
gress made clear that nothing in the EPAct absolves the United
States from any responsibility towards tribes, “including, but not
limited to, those which derive from the trust relationship or from
any treaties, statutes, and other laws of the United States, Execu-
130 25 U.S.C. § 3502(a)(2)(A).
131 Id. § 3502(a)(2)(C).
132 Id. § 3502(a)(2)(D).
133 Id. § 3502(b). See generally  Leslie R. Dubois, Curiosity and Carbon: Examin-
ing the Future of Carbon Sequestration and the Accompanying Jurisdictional Issues as
Outlined in the Indian Energy Title of the 2005 Energy Policy Act , 27 ENERGY L.J.
603 (2006) (examining the three types of sequestration promoted by the EPAct and
the jurisdictional issues related to tribal supervision and control of carbon trading).
134 25 U.S.C. § 3502(c)(1).
135 Id. § 3505(e)(1).
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tive orders, or agreements between the United States and any
Indian tribe.”136
E. The Test Case: Klamath Project—The First Full
Proceeding Under the New Regulations
One of the concerns and challenges faced by hydropower in-
terests involves integrating the new hearings and alternative sub-
proceedings into the existing administrative process.  The
underlying licensing process under the ILP begins with an appli-
cant filing a Notice of Intent.  After a relatively long period of
information gathering, FERC prepares a draft environmental as-
sessment or environmental impact statement; the resource agen-
cies then submit preliminary conditions and prescriptions.137  At
this stage in the process, as discussed above, an applicant can re-
quest a hearing and propose alternative conditions and prescrip-
tions.138  FERC then issues the draft final environmental impact
statement.139  Based on the results of the administrative hearing
and within sixty days of the close of the NEPA comment period,
the resource agencies submit the final modified conditions and
prescriptions.140  The Department’s interim final regulations fit
the administrative, trial-type hearing into the very tight window
between the release of FERC’s draft environmental impact state-
ment and the revision of that draft.  The sixty-day timeframe re-
sults in a very aggressive and demanding schedule for the
administrative hearing.
By fall 2006, the hearings process had been invoked in at least
five major relicensing proceedings—two separate requests in the
Hells Canyon proceeding in Idaho, requests in the Merrimac pro-
ceeding in New York, the Santee Cooper Hydroelectric Project
in South Carolina, the Spokane River Project in Washington,141
and finally for the Klamath Project in Oregon.  Of these five,
136 Id. § 3504(e)(6)(B); see  Miles, supra  note 120 at 472-74 (discussing possible R
effects of Title V on Federal Indian Trust obligations).
137 18 C.F.R. §§ 5.23-5.26 (2007).
138 See  16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 823d (2006).
139 18 C.F.R. § 5.25(a).
140 18 C.F.R. § 5.25(d).
141 For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see generally Eichstaedt, Sherman &
Amos, supra  note 58.  This information is also derived from communications be- R
tween the author and Interior Department attorneys.  The hearing process for the
Spokane River Project concluded on January 8, 2007, with the issuance of a final
decision by the Administrative Law Judge. See id.
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three settled before the proceedings,142 and only the Klamath
and Spokane River Projects have proceeded through the full ad-
ministrative process.143  Appendix A compares and integrates the
ILP and the new hearings and alternatives processes.144  The reg-
ulations also established a deadline for any retroactive EPAct
challenges in pending licensing proceedings.145  Approximately
fifteen licensees requested hearings under this retroactive
provision.146
In the Klamath proceeding, PacifiCorp, the owner and opera-
tor of the Klamath Project, requested a hearing under the new
regulations.  The relicensing process for the PacifiCorp dams in
the Klamath Basin was the first hearing process completed and
provides a useful example of how the administrative pieces all
come together.147  However, the Klamath Project is also distinct
because the ILP was not being used.  The hearing included nearly
thirty attorneys, more than thirty linear feet of documents includ-
ing expert reports and written testimony, and seven days of testi-
mony and cross-examination.148  The case concerned disputed
issues of material fact with respect to preliminary conditions and
prescriptions that the National Marine Fisheries Service and De-
partment of the Interior agencies submitted for inclusion in the
new license for the operation of the Klamath Hydroelectric Pro-
ject.149  The project, located on the upper Klamath River in an
area that covers southern Oregon and northern California, con-
sists of five mainstem dams.150
As the party requesting the hearing, the burden of proof rested
with PacifiCorp to establish its version of the facts on each dis-
puted issue of material fact by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.151  PacifiCorp challenged the fishway prescriptions
contained in the National Marine Fisheries Services Preliminary
142 See id.
143 Id.
144 See  Suzanne Piluso, Timeline Integrating ILP with Hearing and Alternatives
Process, Appendix A.
145 Eichstaedt, Sherman & Amos, supra  note 58. R
146 Id.
147 At the time of publication, the Spokane River proceeding has also been com-
pleted. See id.
148 See In re  Klamath Hydroelectric Project, Docket No. 2006-NMFS-0001, FERC
Project No. 2082, (July 13, 2006).
149 Id. at 3.
150 Id.
151 See id.  at 2 (citing the court’s July 6, 2006, order granting motion to confirm
burden of proof; 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2006) (establishing that the burden of proof rests
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Prescriptions for the Klamath Hydroelectric Project, FERC pro-
ject No. 2082.152  Those preliminary prescriptions were devel-
oped jointly by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the
National Marine Fisheries Service.  The Bureau of Land Man-
agement and Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) each filed separate
preliminary conditions with FERC; PacifiCorp also requested a
hearing on several disputed issues involving these conditions.153
The California Department of Fish and Game, Klamath Tribes,
Hoopa Valley Tribes, Yurok Tribe, Karuk Tribe, Klamath Water
Users Association, Siskiyou County, State of Oregon, and con-
servation groups154 all filed notices of intervention.155  The agen-
cies decided to consolidate the hearing requests, and the matter
was assigned to Judge Parlen L. McKenna to issue a decision on
the disputed issues of material fact within ninety days from the
date of referral, as required by the EPAct and implementing reg-
ulations.156  An initial pre-hearing conference was held on July
6–7, 2006, in which the disputed issues of material fact were nar-
rowed.157  The hearing was held in Sacramento, California, on
August 21, 2006, and ended on August 25, 2006.  Post-hearing
briefs, including proposed findings of fact, were filed on Septem-
ber 5, 2006.  Reply briefs were filed on September 11, 2006.158
The administrative law judge ruled on each party’s findings of
fact.159  Of the fourteen disputed material facts, PacifiCorp pre-
vailed on issues related to the recreational use of the river and
issues on lamprey habitat and survival.160  However, the ALJ did
specifically find that the Pacific lamprey would benefit from ac-
cess to habitat within the Project reach and determined that
PacifiCorp failed to show that the Pacific lamprey would not ben-
efit from access with the Project reaches.161  On the central fac-
with the proponent); and 50 C.F.R. § 221.57 (2006) (adopting the preponderance of
the evidence standard of proof)).
152 Id.  at 3.
153 Id.  at 3-4.
154 The conservation groups were: American Rivers, Trout Unlimited, Northcoast
Environmental Center, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Insti-
tute of Fisheries Resources, WaterWatch of Oregon, California Trout, Friends of the
River, and Oregon Natural Resources Council. Id.  at 4.
155 Id.
156 Id.  at 5.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.  at 11-87.
160 Id.
161 Id.  at 38, 70.
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tual disputes, including whether anadromous fish stock occurred
above the project facilities, whether “trap and haul” proposals
were sufficient, and whether current conditions above the facili-
ties would support repopulation of those fish stocks, Judge McK-
enna found against PacifiCorp and in support of the positions
taken by the resource agencies, Tribes, and conservation
groups.162
Despite legitimate concerns about the time, expense, and moti-
vation behind the new hearings procedures, the federal resource
agencies, conservation groups, and tribes achieved an extremely
positive result through the hearings process.  The factual conclu-
sions included in the order represent a well-reasoned and scien-
tifically based record as the relicensing process moves forward.
While it may be rare that the federal agencies, tribes, and conser-
vation organizations can devote the necessary amount of re-
sources into the hearing process, the Klamath proceeding is, at
minimum, an example of the benefits that may flow from the in-
vestment.  By contrast, however, the new EPAct provisions fall
short of achieving the goal of a streamlined process and arguably
further complicate an already litigious situation.
III
OTHER HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY
IMPACT THE KLAMATH BASIN
In addition to the EPAct changes to the licensing process,
other developments involving hydropower may also have an im-
pact on the settlement dynamics in the Klamath Basin.  First, the
more widespread acceptance of dam decommissioning and re-
moval make the parties increasingly willing to consider this op-
tion.  Several judicial decisions in recent years, including the
decision from the D.C. Circuit on the Cushman Project in the
City of Tacoma,163 have made clear that a resource agency’s con-
ditions and prescriptions do not necessarily need to preserve the
economic viability of the project.  Short of recommending
decommissioning outright, the resource agencies may submit
conditions and prescriptions that ultimately make decommission-
ing inevitable.
Second, PacifiCorp has experience with the decommissioning
and removal process with its Condit Dam facility in Washington
162 Id.  at 11-87.
163 City of  Tacoma v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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and the Powerdale Dam in Oregon.  The ongoing efforts to re-
move the Condit and Powerdale Dams may impact PacifiCorp’s
approach and negotiating position in the Klamath Basin.  In ad-
dition, as Glen Spain’s article addresses, the cost of energy pro-
duction and the unavailability of continued reduced rates in the
basin may change the constituencies that support decommission-
ing, particularly if there are significant gains to the protection of
listed species and tribal trust resources such that the pressure can
be reduced on the deliveries to the Klamath Project.164  Finally,
the very nature of the administrative proceeding in a relicensing
varies from the other forums that have been used to seek settle-
ment in the basin, in that more of the relevant parties are already
in the process.
A. City of Tacoma Decision—Reasonableness of
Dam Removal
A recent decision involving the Cushman Project and the City
of Tacoma, issued in August of 2006, followed the Supreme
Court’s guidance in Escondido and further clarified the relation-
ship between the resource agencies and FERC.  In City of Ta-
coma , the D.C. Circuit held that FERC cannot refuse to
incorporate conditions because they are “untimely” under the
FERC regulations.165  Further, the court held that reasonable
conditions and prescriptions can include requirements that ulti-
mately render a project uneconomical.166  This decision may also
contribute to the willingness to consider dam removal on the
Klamath.167
The case, involving the City of Tacoma and the Skokomish In-
dian Tribe, concerned the City’s operation of the Cushman Pro-
ject hydroelectric operation on the Skokomish River.168  The
Skokomish Indian Reservation, established in 1855 through the
Treaty of Point No Point, lies downstream of the original
Cushman Project.169  Although the Treaty of Point No Point re-
served to the Skokomish Indian Tribe “[t]he right of taking fish
at usual and accustomed grounds,” the Cushman Project diverts
164 Glen Spain, Dams, Water Reforms, and Endangered Species in the Klamath
Basin , 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 49 (2007).
165 City of Tacoma , 460 F.3d at 64-65.
166 Id.  at 73-74.
167 See generally City of Tacoma , 460 F.3d 53.
168 See id.  at 59.
169 Id.
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almost the entire flow of the North Fork of the Skokomish
River.170  The North Fork flows along the edge of the Reserva-
tion and forms part of the boundary, while the main stem of the
Skokomish River flows through the Reservation.171
FERC issued the original license for the Cushman Project in
1924.172  This original license, however, was a “minor part” li-
cense because FERC interpreted its authority at the time to be
limited to federal reservations.173  While parts of the Cushman
Project were on privately owned lands and did not need a permit
under FERC’s early interpretation of its statutory authority,
parts of the Project were on federal lands.174  A second hydroe-
lectric plant was built and situated within the boundary of the
Skokomish Reservation on property the City of Tacoma owns in
fee, but “an access road and transmission line runs across
[R]eservation property.”175  In the view of the D.C. Circuit
Court, as stated in its 2006 opinion, the Project diverts about
ninety-two percent of the North Fork of the Skokomish River’s
flow while only allowing sixty cubic feet per second of water to
pass the project.176  Despite a determination in 1963 that FERC’s
hydropower licensing jurisdiction extended to the whole project
and not just those parts that occupied federal lands, Tacoma con-
tinued to operate until 1974 under the minor part license.177  In
1974, after fifty years of operation, the original minor part license
expired.178
The City of Tacoma applied for a new license in 1974, and
under section 15—which relates to relicensing as opposed to an
original application—FERC was required to issue annual re-
newal licenses.179  The Project operated under these annual re-
newals for another twenty-four years until 1998.180
170 Id.  at 59, 62.  As the court noted, the treaty right to take fish at usual and
accustomed grounds “is now of little value, because the water has disappeared, and
with it, the fish.” Id.  at 12.
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In 1998, FERC issued a new forty-year major license for the
Cushman Project and the license required measures to protect
the environment, remedy past impacts, restore fish populations,
and mitigate project impacts on the tribes.181  The license specifi-
cally called for the project to release 240 cubic feet per second of
water into the North Fork River.182  FERC initially stayed imple-
mentation of the license conditions including these flows.183  In
2005, after a FERC ALJ issued a report emphasizing the critical
importance of releasing the 240 cubic feet per second, FERC par-
tially lifted the stay.184  The court of appeals then stayed the min-
imum-flow provision pending appeal.  As the court of appeals
stated, “Tacoma thus continues to operate the Cushman Project
without any significant license conditions as it has done for ap-
proximately eighty years.”185  Even though the license contained
some conditions, FERC rejected Interior’s 4(e) conditions be-
cause they were untimely and addressed issues outside the Res-
ervation.186  Both the Tribe and Cushman appealed.187  While the
appeal was pending, several species were listed pursuant to the
ESA.188  Subsequent to the ESA consultation between FERC,
the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Marine Fisheries
Service, the appeal went to the D.C. Circuit.189
The Tribe’s claim centered primarily on the idea that for eighty
years the Cushman Project operated with no consideration of the
impacts to the tribal reservation or tribal resources.190  First, the
Tribe argued that the 1974 application should have been an origi-
nal application rather than a relicensing proceeding, because the
1924 license was never valid.191  The court, however, ruled that
FERC did not err in proceeding with the relicensing rather than
an original application.192
Second, the Tribe argued that FERC violated the FPA by fail-
ing to include Interior’s 4(e) conditions because they were un-
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.  at 60.
184 Id.  at 61.
185 Id.
186 See id.  at 60, 64-67.
187 Id.  at 60-61.
188 Id.  at 61.
189 See id.  at 61.
190 See id.  at 61-62.
191 See id.  at 62.
192 Id.  at 63.
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timely.193  On this issue the court ruled that FERC could not set
time limits on the Secretary’s authority under 4(e) of the FPA.194
FERC’s regulation that set time frames for the Secretary to file
conditions exceeded its statutory authority.195  Agencies can
agree on a timeline, but FERC cannot impose a timeline on the
agencies with separate statutory authority to impose conditions
and prescriptions.196  The court ultimately remanded the issue for
FERC to include Interior’s 4(e) conditions.197  Moreover, the
court stated that the transmission line and access road on reser-
vation lands were sufficient to trigger 4(e) authority.198  Section
4(e) authority exists if any or some of the project is on the reser-
vation, and there is no requirement that it be a significant
amount.199  Finally, 4(e) conditions are not limited to mitigating
the impact of the portions of the project that are on the reserva-
tion (here the transmission lines and the access road).200  Rather,
4(e) conditions impose measures to mitigate the effect of the pro-
ject  as a whole on the reservation.201  The term “reservation” as
used in the FPA means any federally owned land within the res-
ervation, not all land comprising the reservations, which can in-
clude some fee land.202  The court’s decision represented a strong
affirmation of the principles set out by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Escondido  more than twenty years ago.203
Third, the Tribe argued that FERC violated the Clean Water
Act by not confirming that the State of Washington issued its
certification with public notice and comment.204  Section 401 of
the Clean Water Act requires procedures for public notice and
193 Id.  at 64.
194 Id.  at 65.
195 Id.
196 See id.
197 Id.  at 78.
198 Id.  at 65-66.
199 See id.
200 Id.  at 66-67.
201 Id.
202 See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 796(2) (2006).  The Federal Power Act
defines “reservations” as “national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian res-
ervations, military reservations, and other lands and interests in lands owned by the
United States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and
disposal under the public land laws; also lands and interests in lands acquired and
held for any public purposes; but shall not include national monuments or national
parks.” Id.
203 See City of Tacoma , 460 F.3d at 65-67; Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla
Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984).
204 City of Tacoma , 460 F.3d at 67-68.
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comment.205  The court ruled that FERC is required, at least, to
confirm that the state has facially satisfied the express require-
ments of section 401, specifically that state certification was made
with notice to the public and opportunity to comment.206  How-
ever, since FERC must reconsider Interior’s 4(e) conditions any-
way, FERC should seek affirmation from the Washington
Department of Ecology that it complied with notice require-
ments when it issued certification.  The failure to confirm notice
and comment alone would not have been enough to declare the
1998 license invalid.207
The Tribe also asserted that FERC violated the National His-
toric Preservation Act and the Coastal Zone Management
Act.208  The court found no violation of either of these stat-
utes.209  Finally, the Tribe claimed that FERC failed to consider
that the City of Tacoma lacks water rights to operate the pro-
ject.210  The court ruled that FERC had no authority to make
decisions regarding water rights claims.211
The City of Tacoma also challenged the conditions and pre-
scriptions imposed on the license.  First, the City argued that the
1998 license was a de facto decommissioning of the Cushman
Project.212  As a result, the new license, they suggested, did not
satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the FPA.213  The court
held that reasonable terms under the FPA can, in some cases,
include terms that may have the effect of shutting a project
205 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006).  The Clean Water Act
provides that “[n]o license or permit shall be granted until the certification required
by this section has been obtained or has been waived.” Id.  To obtain certification
from a state, the state “shall establish procedures for public notice in the case of all
applications for certification by it and, to the extent it deems appropriate, proce-
dures for public hearings in connection with specific applications.” Id.
206 City of Tacoma , 460 F.3d at 68.
207 See id.  at 68-69.  Declining to invalidate Tacoma’s license for want of certifica-
tion under the Clean Water Act, the court expressed concern that if the license was
invalid, FERC would merely issue another annual temporary license to Tacoma that
would lack the 240 cubic feet per second requirement, and therefore be even more
environmentally detrimental. See id.
208 Id.  at 69.
209 See id.  at 69-70.
210 Id.  at 70-71.
211 See id.  at 71.
212 Id.
213 Id.  at 71-72.
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down.214  Whether the federal government or the licensee pays
for a decommissioning was raised but not resolved.215
The City also argued there was no consideration in the NEPA
documents of the environmental impacts if the project were to be
shut down.216  The court responded that, by including Interior’s
4(e) conditions, FERC will need to re-evaluate impacts any-
way.217  These concerns could be part of that analysis on re-
mand.218  Finally, the City argued that FERC relied on flawed
biological opinions issued under section 7 of the ESA.219  The
court ruled that FERC’s reliance on the biological opinion was
allowable because Tacoma presented no new information that
was not considered in the biological opinion process.220
The court of appeal’s opinion in City of Tacoma  is significant
for several reasons.  First, the court established that FERC could
not exclude resource agencies’ 4(e) conditions because they were
untimely pursuant to FERC regulations.221  The court noted that
FERC could no more tell the Secretary how to exercise his au-
thority than the Secretary could tell FERC how to exercise its
authority.222  Second, the court recognized that any or some part
of the project on a reservation triggers the Secretary’s 4(e) condi-
tioning authority.223  Conditions are designed to mitigate the im-
pacts of an entire project, not just those associated with the
project components that occur on tribal lands.224  Third, the court
clearly held that the reasonableness language in the FPA did not
mean that the project had to remain economically viable or that
the conditions could not operate as de facto decommissioning.225
The court clearly responded to Tacoma’s argument by saying that
reasonable conditions may include measures that result in a pro-
ject being shut down—a move that put dam removal squarely on
the table in relicensing proceedings.226





219 Id.  at 74-75.
220 See id.  at 76.
221 See id.  at 64-65.
222 See id.  at 65.
223 See id.  at 65-66.
224 See id.  at 66-67.
225 See id.  at 73-74.
226 See id.  at 74.
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For example, in the current Klamath relicensing, the condi-
tions and prescriptions that were unsuccessfully challenged by
PacifiCorp in the hearings process will now, as modified, become
part of the license.  Commentators have speculated that the fish-
way prescriptions will be so costly that continued operation of
the Project may be impacted.  PacifiCorp has indicated, however,
that they will continue to seek relicensing of the Klamath Project.
The City of Tacoma  decision compromises the argument that for
the conditions and prescriptions to be reasonable, they must pro-
tect the economic viability of the project.
B. Condit Dam Decommissioning
Like the City of Tacoma  decision, the Condit Dam removal
process in Washington State may also be illustrative in evaluating
the Klamath Basin.  In late 1999, PacifiCorp and a myriad of
other parties reached an agreement to remove the Condit Dam
on the White Salmon River in Washington.227  While proponents
of dam removal had been working since the mid-1980s and the
Edwards Dam in Maine had been removed in July of 1999,228 a
removal agreement for the Condit was significant because it will
be the tallest hydropower dam ever removed.229  The parties
agreed to remove the Condit Dam and drain the reservoir by
October of 2006.230  The Condit Dam Settlement marked an
agreement between dam owner PacifiCorp and fifteen environ-
mental groups, two tribal entities, and five government agen-
cies.231  PacifiCorp determined that it would be uneconomical for
the company to continue to operate the dam with the additional
fish and wildlife protection requirements that relicensing would
require.232  Additionally, the cultural and recreational resources
of a free-flowing White Salmon River outweighed the benefits of
keeping the dam.233
227 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, PacifiCorp—American Rivers—
Yakama Nation: Historic Condit Dam Removal Agreement to be Signed (Sept. 22,
1999) (on file with author), available at  www.doi.gov/news/archives/pacifi.html; see
also  Becker, supra  note 1, at 813. R
228 Id.
229 Id.  at 813.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 See id. at 826.
233 See id. at 819-20.
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The agreement allowed PacifiCorp to operate the dam in order
to pay for its removal.234  However, several approvals from vari-
ous government agencies on the federal, state, and local level re-
mained and, ultimately, lead to the extension of the removal
process,235 brought up the potential for litigation,236 and further
stalled the dam removal process.  Currently, removal of the Con-
dit Dam is slated for 2008.237  Based on the proceedings for the
Condit facility in Washington, PacifiCorp has significant experi-
ence evaluating the relative benefits and costs associated with
fishway construction as compared to decommissioning.  As a re-
sult, PacifiCorp will likely approach the economics of the Kla-
math relicensing process differently than a license applicant
without such experience.
C. Contrasting General Stream Adjudication and Litigation
with the Relicensing Process
Previous settlement efforts in the Klamath Basin arose in the
context of judicial proceedings, both state and federal—the
ongoing general stream adjudication initiated by the State of Or-
egon and most recently the federal litigation over the implemen-
tation of the biological opinions issued for the operation of the
Klamath Reclamation Project.  While the hydropower relicens-
ing process possesses some characteristics of a judicial proceed-
ing, particularly with the addition of the hearings process, it
remains essentially an administrative licensing process.  In addi-
tion to its administrative character, the relicensing process also
differs from federal litigation and state adjudication in that “in-
terested parties,” who may not be official parties in the federal
litigation or parties asserting water rights in the state adjudica-
tion, can become active participants in the licensing process.
In the general stream adjudication, only those with claims to
water rights are allowed to participate.238  Thus, non-water-rights
holders with significant interests in the allocation of water among
the various rights holders in the basin are relegated to observing
the proceedings rather than participating and representing their
interests.  To the extent that settlement arises from the state ad-
judication, those settlement efforts will not include these non-
234 Id. at 827.
235 See id. at 828, 830-41.
236 See id. at 841-43.
237 Id. at 814.
238 See, e.g. , OR. ADMIN. R. 690-028-0010(4) (2005).
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water-righted interests—which in the Klamath Basin includes the
fishing industry, local recreational interests, and conservation or-
ganizations.  As a result, any settlement in this context would not
address the full scope of the interests and issues at stake despite
resolving the various water claims.  Without addressing the
broader issues of the fishing, recreational, and conservation com-
munities, any agreement that is reached is open to collateral at-
tack by the interests that were excluded.
The federal court litigation in the Basin suffers from many of
the same issues as the general stream adjudication.  The Klamath
Basin has a rich history of litigation in federal court.  The various
judicial decisions in the Basin represent important resolutions of
particular issues between particular parties, but have not pro-
vided a context for considering all of the competing demands and
interests at stake.  For example, in the litigation that followed the
2001 water shutdown, the federal courts attempted to bring the
parties together to discuss opportunities to resolve what seemed
to be the devastating conflict in the Basin over water alloca-
tion.239  Despite the best intentions, the settlement efforts, like so
many other attempts in the Basin, ultimately failed.240  The fail-
ure may have been based in large part on the fact that not all of
the various interests were fully present at the negotiation table.
While the federal court efforts brought in parties from outside
the litigation, those parties did not have the same kind of stake in
the outcome of the settlement, because they did not have inter-
ests in the underlying litigation.  As a result, some parties were at
the table in body, but not in mind and spirit.
The process for relicensing a private hydropower project, as
described above, differs from the general stream adjudication
and federal litigation because interested parties can intervene
early in the process and become parties to the license.  For exam-
ple, with the Klamath Project many of the non-water-righted in-
terests in the Basin have attained party status in the relicensing
proceeding.241  As a result, a broader range of parties in the Ba-
sin are fully participating in the process and have a vested inter-
est in the outcome of the proceedings.  The ability of all
interested parties to participate sets the table differently for any
239 See  Dan A. Tarlock & Holly D. Doremus, Fish, Farms and the Clash of Cul-
tures in the Klamath Basin , 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 321 (2003).
240 Spain, supra  note 164, at 78-79. R
241 See In re  Klamath Hydroelectric Project, No. 2006-NMFS-0001, FERC Project
No. 2082 (July 13, 2006).
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settlement negotiations and may result in strong settlement op-
portunities that are less likely to be subject to collateral attack.
IV
NON-HYDROPOWER DYNAMICS AT PLAY IN THE
KLAMATH BASIN TODAY
To think that the hydropower relicensing process alone has set
the stage in the Klamath Basin for settlement would be short-
sighted.  As Glen Spain’s Article in this Symposium edition com-
prehensively describes, many factors have brought the Basin
where it is today.242  Among the various factors described in the
Symposium, this Article focuses on three—the 2001 water shut-
down and the resulting litigation, the ongoing litigation by Pacific
Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations on the biological
opinions for Coho salmon in the Basin, and the Fifth Amend-
ment takings claims brought in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
A. The 2001 Shutdown
In 2001, for the first time, the BOR closed the head gate that
delivers water from Upper Klamath Lake to a reclamation pro-
ject in order to comply with biological opinions issued for two
fish species under the authority of the ESA.243  As a result, irri-
gation deliveries were halted to the farming community inside
the Klamath Reclamation Project and a dramatic summer un-
folded.244  The irrigation community immediately sought an in-
junction to prohibit the BOR from withholding water for the
project lands.245  The federal district court denied the injunction
and suggested that the parties try to resolve the water allocation
struggles in the Basin outside of the litigation process.246  Over
the next several years the science underlying the biological opin-
ion was questioned, including a report by the National Research
Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, that con-
cluded there was no firm evidence of a relationship between lake
levels and flows and increased rates of survival for the listed
fish.247  As a result, the federal agencies released new biological
242 See generally Spain, supra  note 164, at 49. R
243 Tarlock & Doremus, supra  note 164, at 283-84. R
244 Id.  at 283.
245 Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195 (D. Or. 2001).
246 See id.  at 1211.
247 COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER
BASIN, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL OPIN-
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opinions based on the ten-year plan proposed by the BOR for
the operation of the project.  The biological opinion issued by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, citing to additional scientific re-
views from Oregon State University and the University of Cali-
fornia at Davis, concluded that the ten-year operation plan
would cause jeopardy to the listed species of fish in Upper Kla-
math Lake.248  The Fish and Wildlife’s biological opinion called
for the lake to be maintained at levels sufficient to protect the
lake fish.249  The biological opinion issued by the National
Marine Fisheries Service for the listed coho salmon in the Kla-
math River, on the other hand, issued a jeopardy opinion, but
called for an increase of flows to be phased in over time.250
B. Coho Biological Opinion Litigation and Injunction
A coalition of fishing groups, led by the Pacific Coast Federa-
tion of Fishermen’s Association, and environmental groups filed
suit challenging the 2002 National Marine Fisheries Service bio-
logical opinion, specifically alleging that phasing in the increased
flows was inconsistent with the requirements of the ESA.251  In
2003, the district court ruled that the ten-year biological opinion
was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on speculative
and future events, such as the development of a water bank and
enforcement of state water law—all of which were outside the
control of the action agency, here the BOR.252  The court rea-
soned that the BOR could not rely on such actions, even if they
were reasonably certain to occur, to avoid jeopardy to the species
today.253  The water users appealed the decision to the Ninth Cir-
IONS ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES OF THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN
26 (2002) available at  http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10296#toc.
248 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BIOLOGICAL/
CONFERENCE OPINION REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF OPERATION OF THE BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION’S KLAMATH PROJECT ON THE ENDANGERED LOST RIVER
SUCKER (Deltistes luxatus), ENDANGERED SHORTNOSE SUCKER (Chasmistes
brevirostris), THREATENED BALD EAGLE (Haliaeetus leucocephalus), AND PRO-
POSED CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE LOST RIVER/SHORTNOSE SUCKERS iii (2001)
available at  http://soda.sou.edu/awdata/021111c1.pdf.
249 Id.
250 NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION, KLAMATH PROJECT
OPERATIONS 52-53 (2002) available at http://swr.nmfs.noaa.gov/psd/klamath/Kpop
BO2002finalMay31.PDF.
251 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 02-
2006 SBA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13745, at *20 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2003).
252 Id.  at *69.
253 Id.  at *56-57.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-1\OEL101.txt unknown Seq: 41 10-AUG-07 11:05
2007] Hydropower Reform 41
cuit Court of Appeals, and in 2005, the appellate court went fur-
ther than the district court, holding additional provisions of the
biological opinion invalid.254  On remand, the district court is-
sued an injunction requiring minimum instream fish flows for the
Klamath River.255  The injunction is currently back on appeal to
the Ninth Circuit.
The ESA litigation in the Klamath Basin has impacted the pos-
sibilities for settlement in several ways.  First, few involved with
the Basin ever anticipated that the 2001 shutdown would occur,
particularly under the leadership of Gale Norton, Bush’s Secre-
tary of the Interior at the time.  Of all the BOR projects in the
West, the potential for the first major clash to occur on the Colo-
rado River, the Middle Rio Grande, or the Platte River seemed
much higher.  As a result, the perspectives on the operation of
the ESA, positive and negative, may have changed expectations
about the kind of settlement terms that may be acceptable.
The extended litigation regarding the 2002 biological opinion
for the coho salmon256 has further demonstrated that the courts
are evaluating agency decisions in biological opinions with in-
creased skepticism.  Rather than deferring to the National
Marine Fisheries Service assessment that reasonably certain fu-
ture actions would avoid jeopardy, the district court delved into
the details of the ESA and the regulatory requirements to find it
an unacceptable calculation of jeopardy to the species.257  With
increased scrutiny from the federal courts, the agencies involved
in the Klamath Basin may be increasingly unwilling to delay
measures for avoiding jeopardy to listed species.
C. The Takings Claims
Finally, the likelihood of a comprehensive settlement has been
impacted by the Court of Federal Claims’ ruling on the nature of
the property interest held by Project water users.258  After the
federal court denied the injunction in 2001, the water users in the
Klamath Project sought relief by filing a takings claim alleging
that the federal government had exacted a Fifth Amendment
254 See  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
426 F.3d 1082, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005).
255 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 02-
2006 SBA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24893, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2006).
256 See generally id.
257 Id.  at *9-25.
258 See  Tarlock & Doremus, supra  note 239, at 331. R
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taking without compensation in violation of the Constitution.259
The claim asserted $1 billion in compensation.260  In August of
2005, Judge Allegra issued an opinion holding that the interests
held by the water users in the Klamath Reclamation Project were
contract rights, not vested property interests subject to compen-
sation when taken by the government under the Fifth Amend-
ment.261  As such, the water users’ remedy lies in contract law,
not the Takings Clause.262  Recently, Judge Allegra issued his
opinion on the contract claims holding that the water users were
unable to recover on a contract theory.263
While the decision of the Court of Claims will likely be subject
to appeal, the rationale underlying the decision is strong and may
also impact the expectations of various interests in the Basin re-
garding the strength of their claims to water as a matter of prop-
erty law rather than contract law.  In addition, the Klamath
takings litigation represents a departure for the water users in the
Project from a position of fighting the substantive provisions of
the ESA to a position of seeking relief from the application of
the ESA.  A takings claim, by its very nature, acknowledges that
the underlying act by the federal government is legal, but that the
result creates the need for compensation.  Finally, the shift from
takings claims to contract claims has raised a host of federal con-
tracting issues that illuminate more fully the expectations and
agreements between the water users in the Klamath Basin and
the BOR over the years.  As a result, the parties in the Basin may
be situated nearer settlement in light of the developments since
2001 than seemed possible during prior settlement negotiations.
259 Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005).
260 See  Tarlock & Doremus, supra  note 239, at 331. R
261 Klamath Irrigation Dist., 67 Fed. Ct. at 524 (“Accordingly, the Court must
conclude that the individual irrigators here are third-party beneficiaries of the dis-
trict contracts.  Because of this, their claims against the United States sound in con-
tract, not in takings.”).
262 Id . at 534. Contra  Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49
Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001) (holding that water users holding contracts with a state
water project had a compensable property interest as against the federal
government).
263 Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, Nos. 01-591 L, 01-5910 L through 01-
59125 L (Fed. Cl. Mar. 16, 2007).
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V
CONCLUSION
Overall, the Klamath Basin remains a complicated and dy-
namic system.  This Article sets out some of the reasons behind
the tentative, but revived, sense of optimism for settlement in the
Basin that has developed over the past several years.  Certainly
the new hydropower regulations, while decried as a detriment to
river restoration, have resulted in a solid factual record for fish-
way prescriptions, and potentially for dam decommissioning and
removal in the Klamath Basin.  The Skokomish decision and
PacifiCorp’s experience with the Condit Dam in Washington may
also represent significant influences as the relicensing proceeding
moves forward.  Outside the hydropower context, the ESA and
takings litigation over the past decade may help to set the table
for settlement.  In the end, however, the issues remain conten-
tious, and livelihoods and cultural traditions are on the line.
That said, for anyone who attended the JELL Symposium, the
sense of renewed optimism about the possibilities for sustainable
solutions and settlement was clear.  Many of the various interests
in the Basin were represented and spoke about their perspectives
on the future of water use and allocation in the basin.  During
her welcome, Melissa Peterson, the Symposium Editor for JELL,
commented on the level of respect and admiration she observed
among all the various parties as she organized the conference.
The parties in the Basin may be close to realizing the return on
their investment of time and energy in search of sustainable solu-
tions.  The hydropower relicensing process may become the fo-
rum for part of this realization.  But, like so many lasting
solutions, the secret may be the timing.  It is hard to imagine any
sustainable solutions emerging without all of the various fac-
tors—hydropower related and not—coming to bear.  And like so
many conflicts, only time will tell.  The stakeholders in the Kla-
math Basin have an opportunity to resolve the difficult issues of
competing demand, over-allocated water resources, and the bal-
ance of societal interests.  In our modern age, this story is in-
creasingly common throughout the West.  If sustainable solutions
can be found in the Klamath Basin, the strategies and mecha-
nisms can be used as a model in basins where the story is
repeated.
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¹ The ILP is found at 18 C.F.R. § 5.1- 5.26.
APPENDIX A:
TIMELINE INTEGRATING THE ILP WITH THE ALTERNATIVES
AND HEARING PROCESSES
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Timeline by Suzanne M. Piluso, University of Oregon
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TIMELINE INTEGRATING THE ILP WITH THE ALTERNATIVES
AND HEARING PROCESSES, CONTINUED
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